Methodological Individualism, rationality, and the economic analysis of politics are closely associated with the Public Choice approach in Administrative Theory. These concepts apply economic principles to political and administrative processes, emphasizing that individuals, whether citizens, politicians, bureaucrats, or interest groups, act according to their own preferences and incentives rather than purely for the public interest. This approach challenged the traditional assumption that governments and public officials always work selflessly for collective welfare. Methodological Individualism is the principle that all social, political, and administrative phenomena can be understood by examining the actions, choices, and motivations of individual actors. It argues that institutions and organizations are the result of individual decisions rather than independent entities with their own objectives. In administrative theory, this perspective shifts attention from abstract concepts such as the "state" or "government" to the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, voters, and interest groups. Every policy decision, administrative reform, or organizational outcome is viewed as the combined result of individual actions. This approach rejects the idea that collective entities possess intentions independent of the individuals who constitute them. It helps explain why similar institutions may produce different outcomes depending on the incentives and preferences of the individuals involved. Rationality is another fundamental assumption in the economic analysis of politics. It suggests that individuals behave rationally by selecting the course of action that maximizes their satisfaction or utility while minimizing costs. Rationality does not necessarily imply selfishness in a moral sense; rather, it means that individuals make consistent