Decentralization, as a process of dispersing authority and decision-making from central to subnational levels, has been a defining feature of modern governance, reflecting both democratic aspirations and the pragmatic need to manage diversity and complexity. In comparative political analysis, examining decentralization in Brazil, India, and Britain reveals how constitutional structures, political institutions, and historical trajectories shape both the design and the outcomes of this process. Each of these countries has pursued decentralization within distinct political frameworks—Brazil as a federal republic in Latin America, India as a quasi-federal democracy in South Asia, and Britain as a unitary yet devolving state in Europe. Their comparative experiences highlight how structural and institutional contexts influence the depth, autonomy, and effectiveness of decentralized governance. In Brazil, decentralization emerged as a critical pillar of democratization following the end of military rule in 1985. The 1988 Constitution fundamentally restructured the state, granting significant autonomy to municipalities, alongside states and the federal government, creating what scholars have termed a “triple-federal” system. Fiscal decentralization was particularly pronounced: municipalities received direct transfers from federal tax revenues through constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms such as the Municipal Participation Fund. The institutionalization of participatory budgeting, first pioneered in Porto Alegre, deepened local-level democracy by allowing citizens to directly influence municipal spending priorities. Structurally, Brazil’s federation is symmetric in formal design, with all states enjoying equal constitutional status, but asymmetrical in practice, given disparities in capacity and resources. The outcomes of decentralization in Brazil have been mixed—on one hand, it strengthened local democracy, expanded access to social services, and fostered policy innovation in areas like health through the Unified Health System (SUS); on the other, it also entrenched clientelism and corruption in weaker municipalities and exacerbated regional inequalities due to uneven administrative capacities. Thus, institutional design and fiscal arrangements allowed for a robust local autonomy, but without strong mechanisms for coordination or accountability, outcomes varied significantly across subnational units. India’s experience with decentralization evolved through a long history of central dominance within a federal framework. The Indian Constitution of 1950 established a federal structure with a strong unitary bias, reflecting the need for national unity and economic coordination in a newly independent and diverse country. While states possessed legislative and executive powers