Industrial sickness represents a persistent challenge within the business environment, as declining industrial units not only weaken economic productivity but also generate unemployment, reduce capital formation, and disrupt supply chains. Recognizing the multi-dimensional impact of sick units, government policy has consistently evolved to provide regulatory mechanisms, financial support systems, institutional restructuring channels, and preventive frameworks. Government policy in relation to industrial sickness focuses on early detection, timely intervention, rehabilitation, and, when necessary, orderly closure. These policies are grounded in the broader objectives of economic stability, industrial revival, and resource optimization within the national economy. A significant feature of government policy is the establishment of a clear definition and criteria for identifying industrial sickness. This is crucial for determining which units qualify for assistance. Traditionally, a unit is considered sick when it incurs continuous losses, has an erosion of net worth, or is unable to meet financial obligations. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 provided a statutory definition and created a formal mechanism to recognize sickness at an early stage. Although the Act was later repealed and replaced by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) framework, the principle of early detection remains central to government policy. Units that show early symptoms of sickness are encouraged to undertake internal corrective measures, while chronic cases are referred to appropriate agencies for restructuring or resolution. Another major feature is the institutional framework created by the government to handle industrial sickness. Earlier, the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR) were established as specialized bodies to examine sickness cases and prepare revival packages. With the implementation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the emphasis shifted from prolonged rehabilitation procedures to time-bound insolvency resolution. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) now serves as the primary authority to process cases of corporate sickness, facilitating either restructuring or liquidation within prescribed timelines. This institutional reform reflects the government’s aim to reduce delays, protect stakeholder interests, and promote efficient resource allocation. Financial assistance and credit support represent another key aspect of government policy. Recognizing that financial constraints often cause or aggravate sickness, the government has formulated schemes to help viable units regain stability. Financial institutions such as SIDBI, IDBI, and public sector banks are encouraged to provide concessional loans, extend credit periods, restructure existing debts, or convert unpaid interest into equity when supporting revival efforts. The government’s policy differentiates between potentially viable