The problem of evil is one of the most enduring and complex issues in the philosophy of religion. It raises fundamental questions about the nature of God, the existence of suffering, and the moral structure of the universe. Philosophers and theologians have long grappled with reconciling the existence of evil and suffering with the idea of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and wholly good deity. This problem is not only philosophical but also deeply existential, as it touches upon human experience, morality, and the meaning of life. At the heart of the problem of evil is a tension between three core propositions: first, that God is omnipotent and has the power to prevent evil; second, that God is omnibenevolent and desires the good of His creatures; and third, that evil exists in the world. The classical formulation, often traced back to Epicurus, suggests that if God is willing to prevent evil but not able, then He is not omnipotent; if He is able but not willing, then He is not wholly good; and if He is both willing and able, then why does evil persist? This presents a logical challenge, sometimes referred to as the logical problem of evil, questioning whether the coexistence of God and evil is logically possible. Evil can be categorized in multiple ways. Philosophers often distinguish between moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil arises from the actions of free agents, such as murder, theft, or betrayal. Natural evil, on the other hand, includes suffering caused by natural events like earthquakes, hurricanes, and diseases. While moral evil is tied to human choices and free will, natural evil poses a particular challenge to theodicies that rely solely on human agency to explain suffering. The presence of natural disasters and illnesses that afflict innocent beings complicates attempts to reconcile the goodness of God with the existence of evil. The concept of free will is central to many responses to the problem of evil. The free will defense, notably developed by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, argues that God grants humans genuine freedom to choose between good and evil. Moral evil results from the misuse of this freedom, and a world with free agents necessarily includes the potential for wrongdoing. According to this view, the capacity for moral choice is a greater good that justifies the possibility of evil. Free will allows humans to develop virtues such as courage, compassion, and justice, which could not exist in a world of pre-determined moral perfection. However, critics argue that free will alone cannot account for natural evil or extreme suffering that seems unrelated to human choices. Another significant approach is the soul-making theodicy, associated with thinkers like Irenaeus and John Hick. This perspective suggests that suffering and evil serve a developmental purpose, shaping humans morally and spiritually. Life’s challenges and adversities provide opportunities for growth, character formation, and the cultivation of virtues that could not arise in a painless world. In this view, God permits evil not as an end in itself but as a means to a higher purpose. While compelling in some respects, the soul-making theodicy faces criticism regarding the extent and intensity of suffering in the world. The extreme suffering of innocents, such as children or victims of natural catastrophes, seems disproportionate and raises questions about whether such experiences can genuinely contribute to moral development. The problem of evil also raises epistemological